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Essay
Comparative Law and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate:
A Step-by-Step Approach Toward State Recognition
William N. Eskridge, Jr.*
On December 20,1999, the Vermont Supreme Court ruled in Baker v. Vermont'
that the state's different treatment of lesbian and gay couples under its marriage law
violated the Vermont Constitution.2 In April 2000, the Vermont legislature
responded by creating a new institution of "civil unions" for same-sex couples. In
June 1999, the government of the Netherlands introduced legislation to recognize
same-sex marriages.3 In one sense, a race has commenced: the Vermont plaintiffs
and the Dutch government are each striving to make their jurisdiction the first in
recent Western history to provide full, formal recognition to same-sex unions as
legal marriages entailing the same rights and obligations as different-sex marriages.
In another sense, this may be a race without a winner. Pragmatists caution that
Denmark moved to the brink of same-sex marriage in 1989 and the state of Hawaii
seemed to be on the verge of recognizing same-sex marriage in 1993, yet both have
hesitated in the face of popular criticism. Most fundamentally, moralists on both the
right and left insist that this is a race that ought to have no winners. Both quail at
the thought of legally recognized same-sex marriages or even civil unions:
conservatives fear that gay marriage will constitute a state stamp of approval on
homosexuality and sodomy, which should instead be considered flawed (at best) or
evil (at worst) alternatives to preferred heterosexuality and procreative intercourse,
while progressives fear that gay marriage will constitute a queer stamp of approval
on the gendered and sex-negative features of middle-class family values.
I have discussed the conservative and progressive critiques of same-sex
marriage in prior publications and have maintained that neither progressives nor
conservatives have yet produced a convincing response to my argument that the
principle of formal equality requires the state to recognize same-sex unions on the
* John A Garver Professor of Jurisprudence, Yale Law School. J.D., Yale Law School, 1978; M.A.,
Harvard University, 1974; B.A., Davidson College, 1973. This essay was originally presented at the University
of Pacific, McGeorge School of Law in 1999 as part of McGeorge School of Law's Distinguished Speaker Series.
I am grateful for the excellent research help provided by Joshua Stehlik.
1. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
2. Id. at 867.
3. See Kees Waaldijk, University of Leiden, The Latest About Lifting the Ban on Marriage for Same-Sex
Couples in the Netherlands (visited Oct. 1999) <http://www.coe.nl/index.html?file=marriage> (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review) (describing the Marriage Bill, which was formally introduced in the Netherlands'
Parliament in June of 1999).
2000 / The Same-Sex Marriage Debate
same terms as which it recognizes different-sex unions. In this Essay, I not only
demonstrate how the events in Vermont and Hawaii link up with those in the
Netherlands and Denmark, but I also correlate those events with the broader
constitutional and theoretical debates as well. My general thesis is that not only
does comparative law reveal the current plurality of legal regulatory regimes, but
it also suggests the likelihood of that pluralism's progressing, slowly but surely, to
state recognition of same-sex unions, and to a pluralism of options for same-sex
partners within most countries. My specific thesis is that comparative international
and domestic experience suggests that, even if some conservative and progressive
criticisms of same-sex marriage end up being true in the short term, most will not
be borne out in the long term. Not only are the expressed fears of the religious right
and radical queer theorists greatly overstated, but they are mutually offsetting as
well.
I. THE SAME-SEX MARRIAGE DEBATE
In Loving v. Virginia,5 a unanimous United States Supreme Court invalidated
Virginia's law prohibiting different-race marriages. Part I of Chief Justice Earl
Warren's opinion ruled that denying a black-white couple a marriage license that
would be given to a similar black-black couple is race discrimination in violation
of the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution.6 The Hawaii
Supreme Court in Baehr v. Lewin7 applied this same kind of analysis to the State's
bar to same-sex marriages.8 Specifically, the court in Baehr held that denying a
female-female couple the marriage license that would be given to a similar female-
male couple is discrimination on the basis of sex, in the same way that denying a
black-white couple a marriage license that would be given to a black-black couple
is discrimination on the basis of race.9 In the latter case, the classification (the
variable item) is the race of one partner; in the former case, the classification (the
variable item) is the sex of one partner. Like the United States Constitution, the
Hawaii Constitution makes sex a classification that cannot be used to confer legal
disadvantages unless there is a compelling justification.'0 That justification cannot
be state encouragement of "natural" gender roles (husband and wife), because
4. The arguments are in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (1996)
[hereinafter ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE], and WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW:
CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OFTHE CLosET chs. 6,8 (1999) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW].
5. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
6. Id at 7-12; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
7. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
8. Id. at 59-67.
9. Id. at68.
10. Haw. CONST. art. I, § 5 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor be denied equal protection of the laws, nor be denied the enjoyment of the person's civil rights or be
discriminated against in the exercise thereof because of race, religion, sex or ancestry.").
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heightened scrutiny of sex-based classifications rests upon the idea that state
insistence on rigid gender roles ordinarily limits individual choice without serving
valid public goals.
Part II of Loving briefly presented an independent ground for striking down
Virginia's law against different-race marriage:
The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one of the vital personal
rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.... To deny
this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a basis as the racial
classifications embodied in these statutes ... is surely to deprive all the
State's citizens of liberty without due process of law."
The United States Supreme Court in Zablocki v. Redhail'2 applied this holding of
Loving to invalidate a state bar to remarriage by people with outstanding child or
spousal support obligations.1 3 Justice Thurgood Marshall's opinion for the Court
ruled that no state restriction of the "'freedom of personal choice in matters of
marriage and family life' can be sustained unless the state can show that its
restriction is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling social purpose. 14 Because there
was no suspicious classification in Zablocki comparable to the race-based
classification in Loving, the stricter judicial scrutiny applied in Zablocki was
justified solely on its restriction of the right to marry. 5
Zablocki involved an equal protection challenge and established a doctrinal
structure logically applicable to other cases: a state law or practice that places a
"direct legal obstacle in the path of persons desiring to get married" denies those
persons the equal protection of the laws unless the state policy is "supported by
sufficiently important state interests and is closely tailored to effectuate only those
interests."' 6 A further implication of Zablocki is that the denial of state recognition
of same-sex marriages on the same terms as different-sex marriages is a denial of
formal equality that must be specially justified by the state. The legal consequences
of state-recognized marriage in this country are vast-including duties of support
and fidelity, presumptions of spousal authority and agency in the event of disability
or death, rights against state or private interference in the spousal relationship, and
more than a thousand duties and rights under federal law. There is serious debate
11. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
12. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
13. L at 377.
14. Id at 385-87 (quoting Cleveland Bd. ofEduc. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632,639-40 (1974)). Justice Lewis
Powell concurred only in the Court's judgment, in large part because he believed the implications of the majority
opinion would also support a right to same-sex marriage. Id. at 396-406 (Powell, J., concurring). Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Stewart concurred only in the Court's result, while Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 391
(Burger, CJ., and Stewart, J., concurring); id. at 407 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 383-87.
16. Id at 387 n.12, 388.
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regarding whether the state over-rewards marriage or over-protects marital
relations. However that debate is resolved, many legal consequences of marriage
that are unequally apportioned in our society will remain. The principle of formal
equality demands that couples wishing to assume these rights and duties ought to
be allowed to do so, unless there is a neutral state justification for excluding them.
This principle of law is also a principle of common sense. Assume you are
running a household of three children, and you set different groundrules as to
important matters for different children, perhaps to the disadvantage of one
particular child.1 7 Such a regime is a bad one: you are not only needlessly hurting
the disfavored child, but you are likely spreading discord among the children and
perhaps even spoiling the preferred children. A regime of unequal treatment invites
jealousy and bad feelings. In this way, the principle of formal equality is a rule
supported by practical experience as well as by the more abstract idea of the equal
dignity and personhood of each human subject. This principle does not insist that
everyone always be treated exactly the same-only that differences in treatment be
justified neutrally and purposively.
The principle of formal equality means that the burden of persuasion as to
same-sex marriage lies with the opponents. The issue should not be "Why gay
marriage?" but should instead be "Why not gay marriage?"
At first, traditionalist opponents argued that different treatment is justified by
the nature of marriage, which inevitably situates same-sex couples outside of it. For
these critics, same-sex marriage is an oxymoron; such relationships, they argue
descriptively, have never been recognized as marriages,18 and, they argue
prescriptively, ought not be so recognized, because marriage ought to involve a man
and a woman at least theoretically capable of having procreative sex. 19 The
descriptive argument is factually oversimple: societies in history, including many
Native American tribes in this country, have recognized same-sex unions as
marriages.20 It also begs the question: How should our society structure the legal
institution of marriage? The prescriptive argument tries to answer that question, but
is too dogmatic by demanding that procreation be an essential goal of marriage.
17. I am thinking of rules for which the different ages of the children do not make a difference. Thus, if
Martha is taught how to drive at age fifteen and then gets her license at age sixteen, then thirteen-year-old Sally
will expect the same treatment-not to be taught how to drive at age thirteen, but to be taught the way Martha was
when she reaches age fifteen. Moreover, the rule of formal equality needs to be understood in light of context,
which might be materially different for the two children. If Sally were blind, she should not be treated the same.
Finally, formal equality can be sacrificed for a neutral reason, especially one related to the activity being
regulated. If Sally proves herself to be a reckless driver during lessons at age fifteen, her parent(s) may justifiably
postpone her applying for a license until she receives further instruction or proves herself more careful.
18. See, e.g., Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971) (holding that statute governing
marriage does not authorize marriage between persons of the same sex, and such marriages are prohibited).
19. See, e.g., John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1049,
1063-76 (1994) (asserting that intercourse between spouses enables them to actualize the blessings of children
and mutual affection).
20. See ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE, supra note 4, ch. 2.
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Should infertile couples, including elderly couples, be disabled from marrying? No
state has ever imposed such a requirement, and none could under the Supreme
Court's right-to-marry jurisprudence. As the Court officially recognized in its last
right-to-marry case, Turner v. Safley,21 the first and, for most people, the most
important role of marriage is "expression[] of emotional support and public
commitment"--namely, the unitive goal of marriage (as opposed to its procreative
goal). 22
Moreover, this kind of oppositionist rhetoric buttresses the sex discrimination
argument for same-sex marriage by showing how resistance to same-sex marriage
rests upon an insistence on rigid gender roles. To tell a woman that she cannot
legally marry a woman is to restrict the woman's choice more fundamentally than
to tell her she cannot attend the Virginia Military Institute (VMI) or administer her
parents' estate.2 To tell a woman that the state will recognize her committed union
only if she agrees to be a wife to a wedded husband is a more dogmatic insistence
on rigid gender roles than is a state's decision to allow eighteen-year-old women,
but not eighteen-year-old men, to buy 3.2% beer.24 If women's exclusion from VMI
and state preference in beer sales are both unconstitutional, as the Supreme Court
has held,25 because they limit choice and rest upon rigid gender roles, then refusing
to recognize a woman's choice of another woman as her life partner is not only just
as unconstitutional, but more deeply so.
Although the definitional argument against same-sex marriage prevailed among
judges and legislators before the 1990s, this argument's factual ignorance and
normative sexism reinforces the power of my argument of formal equality. The
factual ignorance of the definitional argument suggests that other motives were at
work. The usual suspect is homophobia, which is inspired not just by the disgust
that oral or anal sex arouses in many Americans, but is more fundamentally inspired
by women's and men's abandonment of traditional gender roles. 26 The rigid gender
roles insisted upon by the definitional argument suggest that ultimately it is sexism
21. 482 U.S. 78 (1987) (protecting incarcerated prisoners' right to marry).
22. Id. at 95. Turner did not change the analytical structure created by Loving and Zablocki, which requires
the state to justify with the strongest policy reasons why it excludes some couples from the marriage rights
routinely granted to others. What Turner did clarify was the nature of the right itself. Loving and Zablocki gave
some emphasis to the procreative goal of marriage. Turner, in contrast, stressed the social, or unitive, goal of
marriage, where marriage is an institution of commitment. Because some of the prisoners would never be able to
consummate their marriages, the unitive goal was the only one applicable for many in the protected class.
23. See Virginia v. United States. 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (public paramilitary college cannot exclude
women); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (state cannot give males a preference in administering estates even
if, as implied, men are likely to have more business experience).
24. Cf Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 199-210 (1976) (holding it unconstitutional sex discrimination for
the state to allow eighteen-year-old women, but not eighteen-year-old men, to buy 3.2% beer, even though there
was strong evidence that men were more likely to drink and drive than were women).
25. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 519; Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-210.
26. Although adulterous President William Clinton survived the knowledge that he was regularly fellated
by White House intern Monica Lewinski, you can be sure the reaction would have been more severe if the
President had been fellated by the equally obsequious George Stephanopolous.
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that drives this exclusion, thereby mobilizing the moral and political force of sex
discrimination jurisprudence. Same-sex couples, and couples that resist easy
classification as same- or different-sex, ought to be treated the same as conventional
different-sex couples in the eyes of the law.
While the definitional argument against same-sex marriage remains popular,
it has been supplemented and, among intellectuals, replaced by other arguments that
are explicitly consequentialist. Such arguments focus on assertedly bad social
consequences that follow from legal recognition of same-sex marriages. Some
conservatives maintain that same-sex marriage would promote homosexuality and
place a state "stamp of approval" on a status that is either wicked or suboptimal,
especially for impressionable adolescents who would otherwise marry, procreate,
and raise a family.27 Some progressives maintain that same-sex marriage would
promote patriarchal marriage and place a state stamp of approval on assimilation
of gay people into the straight mainstream,28 an assimilation that they view as
wicked or suboptimal, especially for impressionable adolescents who might
otherwise blaze their own queer paths.29
Both critiques of same-sex marriage make unsupported factual assumptions and
wantonly speculate about the consequences of same-sex marriage. Also, both
critiques cannot be right: many radical progressives would be delighted if same-sex
marriage actually did promote homosexuality, and at least some conservatives
ought to be satisfied if it gave marriage a helping hand. Relatedly, the newer
conservative and progressive critiques help answer one another: conservatives
should heed the progressive observation that same-sex marriage is state
encouragement of interpersonal commitment most of all, while progressives ought
to concede the conservatives' observation that same-sex marriage would contribute
to the erosion of traditional gender roles (patriarchy) within the institution of
marriage, which promises to open up more choices for women as well as men.
Especially as attenuated, neither criticism can trump the principle of formal
equality, and critics of both stripes would better focus their time and energy on
issues that actually advance the values they advocate; conservatives might spend
more energy supporting marriages of all kinds and remedying the tendency of men
to dump and pauperize their wives who tend to invest more in the relationship, the
children, and even the husbands' careers, while progressives might work toward
social and institutional supports for more informal families of choice, such as
friendship linkages and community support groups.
27. E.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 311 (1992).
28. See Nancy D. Polikoff, We Will Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will
Not "Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage," 79 VA. L. REV. 1535, 1536-43 (1993).
29. E.g., Paula L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN Q.,
Fall 1989, at 9, 9-12, reprinted in WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXuALrrY, GENDER, ANDTiH
LAW (1997).
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One source of insight that is largely absent from the same-sex marriage debate
has been comparative law. Six countries-Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Iceland,
Greenland, and the Netherlands-have adopted laws endowing registered same-sex
partnerships with almost all the legal rights and duties associated with marriage.30
France has created a new institution, the civil solidarity pact, which includes some
of the benefits and duties related to marriage of same-sex couples. Canada and
Hurgary have allowed same-sex partners all the benefits and obligations legally
accorded different-sex cohabiting couples. What lessons does the comparative
experience offer the same-sex marriage debate? Surprisingly many.
II. SAME-SEX PARTNERSHIPS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
The tables below set forth basic comparative law information for state
regulation of gay people and their unions, including same-sex registered
partnerships. These tables tell us nothing about the subjective experience of same-
sex couples in any of these countries, and it is too early to tell how state recognition
of same-sex partnerships will play out. Nonetheless, these tables do tell us much
about the path to legalized same-sex marriage. The path is step-by-step and
incremental, inevitable in some jurisdictions, impossible elsewhere in the short
term, and sedimentary in the sense that new institutions are being piled on top of
old ones. Consider these points in some detail.
A. The Step-by-Step Principle
Table 1 sets forth, for selected countries, the dates on which each country
adopted a progay change in its law: repealing laws criminalizing consensual
sodomy, equalizing the age of consent for same-sex and different-sex intercourse,
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, affording same-sex
cohabiting couples the same rights and obligations as different-sex couples,
recognizing same-sex unions as "registered partnerships" or the like, and expressly
allowing same-sex partners to adopt children on the same terms as married couples.
Only Denmark has adopted all these gay-equality measures. Most countries in the
table-and a large majority not in the table-have adopted few or none.
The overriding lesson of Table 1 is that legal recognition of same-sex
unions-or, ultimately, marriages-comes through a step-by-step process." Such
a process is sequential and incremental: it proceeds by little steps that are taken in
30. References for the laws discussed in this paragraph can be found in Appendix I to this Article.
31. The materials contained in Table 1 are taken from Appendix I, supra. See generally THE SOCIOLEGAL
CONTROL OF HOMOSEXUALITY: A MULTI-NATION COMPARISON (Donald J. West et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter
MULT-NATIONAL COMPARISON]; International Lesbian and Gay Association, World Legal Survey (visited Apr.
2000) <http://www.ilga.org> (copy on file with the McGeorge Law Review).
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a particular order.32 Registered partnership laws, just short of same-sex marriage,
have not been adopted until a particular country has first decriminalized consensual
sodomy and equalized the age of consent for homosexual and heterosexual
intercourse, then has adopted laws prohibiting employment and other kinds of
discrimiination against gay people, and finally has provided other kinds of more
limited state recognition for same-sex relationships, such as the giving of legal
benefits to or the enforcing of legal obligations on cohabiting same-sex couples.
The recurrence of the same pattern in country after country suggests this
paradox: law cannot move unless public opinion moves, but public attitudes can be
influenced by changes in the law. For gay rights, the impasse suggested by this
paradox can be ameliorated or broken if the proponents of reform move step-by-
step along a continuum of little reforms. There are a number of pragmatic reasons
why such a step-by-step process can break the impasse over a period of time. Step-
by-step change permits gradual adjustment of anti-gay mindsets, slowly empowers
gay rights advocates, and can discredit anti-gay arguments. Consider each.
32. See Kees Waaldijk, The "Law of Small Change": How the Road to Same-Sex Marriage Got Paved in
the Netherlands 1-3 (July 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author). This paper was authored for
and presented at a conference entitled Legal Recognition of Same-Sex Partnerships: A Conference on National,
European, and International Law, in London, England.
Country
Netherlands
Denmark
Iceland
Sweden
Norway
Greenland
Finland
Canada
Spain
Catalonia
Aragon
Israel
France
Germany
Czech Republic
Hungary
South Africa
Belgium
Russia
United
Kingdom
England
Scotland
N. Ireland
Ireland
Brazil
China
India
Mexico
Pakistan
1988
1982
1994
1990
1998
1985
1997
Proposed
1988
1791
1969
1961
1961
1998
1792
1993
1967
1980
1982
1993
1823
1992
1985
1997
Proposed
1998
1999
1998
Proposed
Proposed
Proposed
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Table 1
Progay Laws Outside the USA, Selected Countries
Consensual Equal Age of First Anti- Benefits
Sodomy Consent for Discrim- for Same-Sex Registered
Decrim- Same-Sex ination Cohabiting Partnership
inalized Relations Law Couples Legislation
1810 1971 1992 Yes 1998
1930 1976 1987 Yes 1989
n.k. 1992 1996 1996 1996
1944 1978 1987 1987 1995
1972 1972 1981 Yes 1993
1930 1978 1987 Yes 1994
1971 1998 1995 Yes Proposed
1969 1969 1996 1999
1822 1995 1995 Proposed
Adoption
by Same-
Sex Partners
Proposed
1999
Proposed
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Paul's experience on the road to Damascus is exceptional; human beings rarely
change their fundamental attitudes overnight. But one's anti-gay attitudes-or at
least one's willingness to give vent to or act on them-can change as the culture
changes. If you are a thirty-year-old man who is sickened by the idea of
homosexuality or of "homosexuals," you are highly unlikely to support gay
marriage, but you might be open to sodomy decriminalization for practical reasons,
such as your belief that the state is wasting its time snooping around people's
bedrooms. Yet sodomy decriminalization and a lessening of public condemnation
of homosexuality will sooner or (probably) later embolden some of your gay
friends, family members, and coworkers to come out of their closets. You will
probably be shocked at first, and you can assimilate them as exceptions to your
dislike of "homosexuals," but there is a good chance that some of your anti-gay
attitudes will soften as you enter middle age.33 Over time, maybe a long period of
time, your interaction with gay people might open you up to acquiescing in anti-
discrimination laws, for your experience has been that gay coworkers are okay and
that anti-gay workers are troublemakers. You could still oppose same-sex marriage,
but even this attitude might bend when your daughter partners with another woman
and you and your spouse integrate her into your extended family in a variety of
ways. Because your other children have long known of your daughter's orientation,
they are cool with the issue more generally. As each step in the progression toward
gay equality encourages more people to be openly gay, not only can middle-aged
homophobic attitudes change, but the attitudes of new generations might start out
less homophobic. These changes will support gay equality. The foregoing is,
however, only one among several possible scenarios. Because the homophobe may
have a traumatic experience that confirms his dislike or simply ignores or denies
positive information, his preexisting anti-gay attitudes may be completely resistant
to change?4
Even if underlying attitudes do not change significantly, legal incrementalism
can contribute to gay equality. In this regard, consider not only the information in
Table 1, but that in Table 2, on the next two pages.35 Table 2 sets forth, for all 50
American states and the District of Columbia, the dates on which each state adopted
a progay change in its law: repealing laws criminalizing consensual sodomy (or
33. Surveys have found that knowing gay people is negatively correlated with having anti-gay attitudes.
See Gregory M. Herek, Beyond "Homophobia": A Social Psychological Perspective on Attitudes Toward
Lesbians and Gay Men, in BASHERS, BAITERS &BIGOTS: HOMOPHOBIA IN AMERICAN SOCIErY 1, 13-15 (John P.
DeCecco ed., 1985).
34. On the strong persistence of anti-gay attitudes notwithstanding gay liberation and thousands of coming
out stories, see ALBERTD. KLASSENETAL, SEX ANDMORALITY INTHEU.S.: ANEMPIRICALENQUIRY UNDERTHE
AUSPICES OF THE KINSEY INSTITUTE 165-84 (Hubert J. O'Gorman ed., 1989).
35. The information found in columns one, three, and four of Table 2 are taken from ESICTIDGE, GAYLAW,
supra note 4, at 328-37, 356-61; the data contained in columns three, four, and five is from WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR. &NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALrrY, GENDER, AND THE LAW 863-68, 949 (1997); the materials found
in columns two and six are taken from Appendices H and III, supra.
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reducing it to a misdemeanor), enhancing defendants' sentences for crimes
involving gay-bashing, prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination in public and
(then) private employment, allowing a same-sex partner to adopt her partner's
children as a "second parent," and extending benefits to state employees who are
same-sex "registered partners."
Table 1 and 2 suggest that discriminalization of sodomy might pave the
way-and probably is a precondition-for the adoption of anti-discrimination laws.
Not only does sodomy repeal remove a popular objection to anti-discrimination
laws, 36 but it facilitates the political conditions for such laws. Repeal of sodomy
laws not only emboldens some gay people to come out of their closets, but also
emboldens the uncloseted to organize themselves politically and press for other
equality assurances, such as laws that prohibit discrimination against them in the
private as well as public spheres. 7 The more openly gay people there are and the
better organized they are politically, the greater attention politicians and judges will
pay to their arguments for equal legal entitlements, even if popular attitudes are
otherwise unaffected. Again, the dynamics might work the opposite way under
unfavorable circumstances: if the newly uncloseted were to cause some terrible
incident, there could be a backlash not only against fufther rights for gay people,
but also against the new rights that had just been recognized.
36. That is, one can logically object to adopting an anti-discrimination law that protects people whose
conduct (such as consensual sodomy) is habitually criminal. How can you protect a status group whose
characteristic conduct is felonious? Foran argument of this sort, see Romerv. Evans, 517 U.S. 620,640-43 (1996)
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
37. Because members of a potential interest group have incentives to "free ride" on the efforts of others,
diminished political activity will ordinarily occur on behalf of that group. For gay people, the free rider problem
is particularly severe, because most gay people are closeted. Once uncloseted, gay people's incentives to organize
are much greater, but are impeded by threats of losing their jobs or other private as well as public retaliation.
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Sodomy
State Decrim.
Vermont 1977
California 1975
Hawaii 1972
D.C. 1994
New Jersey 1978
Massachusetts (1974)
New York 1980
Illinois 1961
Minnesota (1977)
Wisconsin 1983
Connecticut 1969
New Hampshire 1973
Nevada 1993
Rhode Island 1998
Oregon 1971
Washington 1975
Pennsylvania 1980
Ohio 1972
Colorado 1971
Louisiana 1999
Delaware 1972
Iowa 1976
Kentucky 1992
Maine 1975
Nebraska 1977
Florida (1971)
Alaska 1978
Georgia 1998
Indiana 1976
Montana 1997
New Mexico 1975
North Dakota 1973
South Dakota 1976
Tennessee 1996
Table 2
Progay Legal Measures, States of the USA
Public Private
Hate Emp. Emp.
Crime Discrim. Discrim.
1989 1991 1991
1991 1979 1979
1991 1991
1990 1977 1977
1995 1991 1991
1996 1989 1989
1983
1991 1996
1989 1986 1993
1991 1982 1982
1990 1991 1991
1997 1997 1997
1989 1999 1999
1991 1985 1995
1989 1987
1993 1985
1975
1983
Second Registered
Parent Partner-
Adoptions ship
1993 1998
(1980s) 1999
1995
1995 1994
1995
1993
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Table 2
Progay Legal Measures, States of the USA
Public Private Second Registered
Sodomy Hate Emp. Emp. Parent Partner-
State Decrim. Crime Discrim. Discrim. Adoptions ship
West Virginia 1976
Wyoming
Maryland
Arizona
Arkansas
Kansas
Michigan
Missouri
Texas
Alabama
Idaho
Mississippi
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Virginia
Utah
(1977) (1997)
(1977)
(1969)
(1980)
(1977)
(1973)
Another way that incrementalism works to facilitate gay equality is even more
subtle but is potentially powerful in the long term. Opponents typically argue that
pro-gay measures will have catastrophic consequences-rampant promiscuity and
public lewdness, predation against children, and erosion of families.38 These ills do
not in fact occur when states adopt gay equality measures, in part because the
predictions are irrational and hysterical to start with, and in part because the
measures are so incremental. When sodomy laws are repealed, gay people do not
drastically change their sexual practices, and only a minority of gay people are
encouraged to be bolder in the public arena. The Scandinavian registered
partnership laws dramatically illustrate how the persistence of the closet can itself
contribute to arguments for gay rights. As Table 3 reveals, 39 few same-sex couples
have registered under Scandinavian partnership laws offering them almost all the
benefits and obligations pertaining to different-sex married couples. Not only have
38. E.g., GEORGE GRANT & MARK A. HORNE, LEGISLATING IMMORALrY: THE HOMOSEXUAL RIGHTS
MOVEMENT COMES OUT OFTHE CLOSET (1993). See also ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 4, ch. 3, for examples
of exaggerated predictions made by opponents of gay rights in the 1970s.
39. Table 3 is taken from materials distributed at the Conference on Legal Recognition of Same-Sex
Partnerships organized by Professor Robert Winterute (Kings College) for July 1999.
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few couples registered under these laws, but observation by scholars in those
countries has detected no significant effects, good or bad, for the society as a whole.
The incrementalism-indeed, the sloth-like pace-by which social practices and
law have changed undermines the apocalyptic rhetoric of anti-gay groups. The
homophobes who cried wolf against sodomy repeal lose some credibility when they
cry wolf again during debates about anti-discrimination laws and measures
recognizing same-sex unions.
Table 3
Partnership Registration in Five Countries, 1990-98
Denmark Norway Sweden Iceland Netherlands
1990 746 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
(MM/FF) (5731173)
1991 258 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
(MM/FF) (171/87)
1992 218 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
(MM/FF) (139n79)
1993 185 n.s. n.s. n.s. n.s.
(MM/FF) (124/61)
1994 197 294 n.s. n.s. n.s.
(MM/FF) (105/92) (203/91)
1995 194 98 333 n.s. n.s.
(MM/FF) (I19n5) (64/34) (249/84)
1996 199 127 160 n.s. n.s.
(MM/FF) (106193) (80/47) (101/59)
1997 178 118 131 33 n.s.
(MM/FF) (1oin7) (75/43) (79/52) (16/17)
1998 197 n.a. 125 12 5217
(MM/FF) (84/113) (79/46) (5/7) (1860/1487)
Total 2372 674 749 45 5217
(MM/FF) (1498/874) (442/232) (508/241) (21/24) (1860/1487)
B. The Progressivity Thesis
The foregoing incremental and sequential process is also progressive: each step
in this process is a step toward formal equality for lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and
possibly transgendered people. While recognition of same-sex unions is impossible
and barely conceivable until other anti-discrimination measures have been adopted,
and anti-discrimination laws are usually not possible until sodomy has been
decriminalized, the decriminalization of sodomy makes it easier to adopt anti-
discrimination laws, which in turn make it easier to recognize same-sex unions, for
the reasons developed above. Once same-sex unions are euphemistically recognized
as "registered partnerships," and modest numbers of people take advantage of the
new institution to formalize their well-ordered middle-class unions, it would then
be, I hypothesize, a smaller step to recognize same-sex marriage. The implication
is that recognition of same-sex marriage is likely, so long as: (1) the preparatory
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steps are followed; (2) gay people come out of their closets and insist on equal
rights; and (3) society does not perceive disastrous consequences flowing from the
steps it has already taken.
This is a breathtaking thesis only if viewed in the short term. Fifty years ago,
it would have been preposterous to think that consensual sodomy would be widely
decriminalized in the United States, as it is today (Table 2). Thirty years ago,
extending antidiscrimination protections to gay people in the workplace would have
been unthinkable almost anywhere in the Western world, whereas today such
protections are commonplace (Tables 1 and 2). Fifteen years ago, it would have
been visionary to think that a Western state would create a registry and benefits for
same-sex partnerships, such as now exist in seven countries (Tables 1 and 3) and
the state of Vermont, and insane to believe that same-sex marriages would be
seriously debated all over Europe and the United States, as they are today. Yet the
beginning of the millennium bears witness to the seriousness of this debate. The
Netherlands or Vermont may or may not recognize same-sex marriages in the next
few years, but some state will in the foreseeable future. Once that happens, and God
fails to send the locusts down on that state,4° other states will follow along. This
process might take years, it might take decades, but it will take place.
A skeptic can reasonably object that this is the sort of progressive, whiggish
approach to history that has repeatedly been undone by the unpredictability of
human events. Depressions, wars, and technological developments-to identify
only the most obvious monkey-wrenches--can derail this train of legal innovation.
I agree and argue only that external shocks can accelerate, as well as derail, the
progression. Moreover, the critical long-term social trends work in favor of
expanding gay rights. Consider what it is that distinguishes the most pro-gay
countries and states in Tables 1 and 2 from the most anti-gay countries and states.
An obvious variable is relative urbanization. In general, the countries and states
with large rural and small-town populations are less open to gay equality than those
whose populations are concentrated in large cities and their suburbs. Urbanization
correlates positively with gay equality for a variety of reasons: gender-benders and
sexual minorities have greater freedom in big cities to form subcultures, a
phenomenon which in turn draws such people away from rural areas; urban life
discourages large families and offers women more opportunities outside the home,
which undermines traditional gender roles (woman gives birth to and cares for
children, man earns money); and as procreation declines and social opportunities
multiply in urban settings, sex for pleasure becomes relatively more acceptable. In
the United States, the most pro-gay states are those of the urbanized Northeast
corridor, those ringing Lake Michigan, and the West Coast states; the least pro-gay
40. Indeed, it is much more likely that the "first move" on same-sex marriage will reap economic benefits,
rather than the Wrath of God. See Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Competitive Federalism and the Legislative Incentives
to Recognize Same-Sex Marriages, 68 S. CAL L. REV. 745 (1995).
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states tend to be the more rural ones of the South, Great Plains, and Rocky
Mountains (Table 2).
Whatever the precise fate of big cities, clustering of human beings in urban
suburban, and exurban (suburban-urban) areas appears to be a robust trend in
industrialized, technology-driven modem states. That social trend undercuts
attitudes that form the basis for homophobia: namely, gender rigidity and sex
negativity.4" Thus, even without a step-by-step approach to gay equality, popular
attitudes ought to evolve in gay-friendly ways because of urbanization alone. An
increasingly urbanized population will be increasingly receptive to the incremental
campaign for full gay equality.
That legal recognition of same-sex marriage is probable does not mean that
such recognition will be universal. Tables 1 and 2 suggest that, even if the
Netherlands and Vermont were to legalize same-sex marriage, other countries and
states would not, either in the short term or in the long term. States like Mississippi
and Idaho, and countries like the United Kingdom and Argentina, would be
unprepared to follow Vermont and the Netherlands, to the extent that those
jurisdictions continue to criminalize gay people for their consensual intimacy.
However long it takes to recognize same-sex marriage in the Netherlands and
Vermont, it will take much longer to do so in the United Kingdom and Mississippi.
Although I think same-sex marriage is an idea whose time has come, I also think
that it will not come to some jurisdictions for a long time, if ever. Countries in
Northern Europe and states in the Northeastern United States are most likely to lead
the way, given their readiness under the step-by-step principle, but it is really
unclear how many countries or states would recognize same-sex marriage even in
the medium term and even if urbanizing trends continue.
There is another variable that makes the matter even less predictable. Return
to Tables 1 and 2, which show that urbanization does not perfectly correlate with
advances in gay rights. This variable hardly explains why the Netherlands is more
gay-friendly than the United Kingdom or why Vermont is much more gay-friendly
than Michigan. Utah, Virginia, and Texas are extremely anti-gay, yet are more
urbanized than Vermont and are not much less urbanized than such pro-gay meccas
as Oregon and Wisconsin. Internationally, the big puzzle is why the Scandinavian
countries are so much more pro-gay than comparably urbanized countries like
Switzerland and, most strikingly, the United Kingdom. A secondary variable is
whether fundamentalist religion plays an important role in the public culture of a
Western-acculturated country or state.42 In America, states where the aggressively
anti-gay Southern Baptist Convention and the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints have the most members are, generally speaking, the most anti-gay in their
41. See ESKRIDGE, GAYLAW, supra note 4, ch. 6; KLASSENETAL, supra note 34, at 225-27,240-41.
42. Cf. KLASSENErAL, supra note 34, at 227-28, 238-39 (explaining that religious devoutness, especially
when fundamentalist Protestant, most accurately predicts anti-homosexual attitudes).
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policies. Internationally, countries where organized religion has become politically
domesticated (Scandinavian nations and the Netherlands) are most likely to have
pro-gay policies. Countries where religious involvement in politics is viewed with
suspicion (France, Belgium) are likely to have intermediate policies, and countries
with active involvement of religions in politics (Latin America and the United
States) will have anti-gay policies.
Unlike increasing urbanization, which seems predictable in the medium term,
the role of fundamentalist religion in public culture is much less predictable. To my
knowledge, no one has ever successfully predicted the trajectory of religious
enthusiasm.43 Indeed, that trajectory might be influenced by gay people's efforts to
secure equal rights. As gay rights and openly gay people have become part of the
public culture, fundamentalist religions in the United States have not only been
energized in their efforts to confront that development, but have reordered their
religious beliefs to make homophobia doctrinally central. Thus, it is quite possible
that recognition of same-sex marriages in one or a few jurisdictions could massively
reenergize religious fundamentalism and trigger a national ortransnational backlash
against gay rights. If that were to occur, the United States and the world could end
up with a long-term division between jurisdictions recognizing same-sex unions or
marriages and those not recognizing such unions or marriages. If most states did
adopt same-sex union or marriage statutes, however, the U.S. Supreme Court would
probably require all states to do so as a matter of constitutional equal
protection-just as it did a generation ago for different-race marriage in Loving v.
Virginia.
C. The Sedimentary Precept
Each step toward same-sex marriage is typically sedimentary:44 rather than
displacing earlier reforms, the new reform simply adds another legal rule or
institution on top of the earlier one. In this way, the same-sex marriage movement
has contributed to a transformation in the options the state offers to different-sex
as well as same-sex couples. Thus, when Denmark enacted its registered partnership
law, it did not revoke the legal rights of cohabiting same-sex couples. In 1998, the
Parliament in the Netherlands enacted a law recognizing registered partnerships,
granting to such unions most of the rights, benefits, and obligations of marriage (but
not the name "marriage"). Unlike Denmark's pioneering law, the Dutch law made
registered partnerships available to different-sex as well as same-sex couples, and
about a third of the registrants have been different-sex couples (Table 3). This
43. Indeed, so predicting is even more treacherous than predicting the weather. Zealots and officials who
were confident that the cult of Jesus could be extinguished by crucifying its leader are only the most famous
example of the way in which conventional judgment fails to account for religious movements. Who would have
predicted in the 1960s that the "religious right" would be an important player in national politics in the 1980s?
44. Cf. Barry Friedman & Scott B. Smith, The Sedimentary Constitution, 147 U. PA.L. REv. 1 (1998).
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example suggests that the experimentation in social policy triggered by the same-
sex marriage movement can, and perhaps ought to, create new institutions available
to all kinds of couples, not just same-sex couples. Consistent with the sedimentary
precept, the 1999 bill to recognize same-sex marriages in the Netherlands would not
displace registered partnerships, which would remain available for different-sex as
well as same-sex couples even if same-sex marriage were recognized.
The same-sex marriage movement is part of a larger evolution in the way the
state regulates human coupling. Today in the Netherlands, and tomorrow in many
other jurisdictions, couples of all kinds will have a menu of options:
* Dating (Tort/Criminal Law). Couples can just date and be intimate
friends. Such a relationship can be important for the couple, as some
people do not want any further level of commitment. These
relationships are regulated by law, primarily to protect each partner
against actionable wrongs committed against her by the other partner.
Criminal and civil tort law prohibit sexual assault, libels, theft or
conversion of assets, blackmail, and the like. This is admittedly a
minimalist level of regulation.
o Cohabitation (Contract Law). Almost all couples start by dating; some
of those couples then decide to cohabit. This move not only signals a
closer relationship, but in Western polities often entails more legal
obligations. In addition to the obligation not to commit torts or crimes,
the United States, Canada, and most Western European countries
impose some contractual obligations on the partners as a matter of law
or implied contract. Not only will the state enforce explicit promises
made to induce cohabitation and a particular sharing of duties, but the
state will also protect the reliance interests of partners and protect
against unjust enrichment of one partner at the expense of the other.
Thus, cohabiting partners may have duties of mutual maintenance and
support; a partner who furthers his career while his cohabitant
maintains the household may be held financially accountable in the
event of a breakup.
* Cohabitation Plus (Unitive Benefits). Some countries, such as Canada
and the Netherlands, not only enforce tort law and expansive contract
principles to protect cohabiting partners, but also offer the partners
some specific benefits. I call them "unitive" benefits, because they
typically involve rules treating the partners as coupled and granting
them financial and other benefits that reflect their unity, at least as to
some matters. In the United States and France, cohabitation plus is
accomplished through domestic partnership and civil solidarity pacts,
respectively. Under the new French law, civil partners can file joint tax
returns, the state makes it easier for a noncitizen partner of a French
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citizen to immigrate to France, and employers are required to make
allowances for partners' vacation plans. 45 American domestic
partnership laws usually just allow formal registration and provision of
fringe benefits to partners of state employees.
Registered Partnership (Regulatory Benefits and Duties). After or
instead of cohabiting, many couples decide to commit to a longer-term
partnership. The Netherlands and the Scandinavian countries allow
these couples to register as partners. Registered partners are not only
governed by tort law and contract precepts, and not only have some
unitive benefits granted by the state, but also have a whole range of
duties as well as benefits under state law. The only benefits usually not
allowed are those relating to children, such as marital preferences in
adoption and presumptions that children born in the relationship are the
biological children of the couple. (The Netherlands has already
dropped this exception, and other countries will likely do so as well.)
* Marriage (Regulatory Benefits and Duties). The traditional way
couples commit to a long-term relationship is, of course, through
marriage. Under the sedimentary precept, the state will continue to
support, as well as recognize, marriage, with all the rights and duties
entailed in registered partnerships as well as the children-related rights
noted above. It is also possible that the state will re-think its regulatory
regime, and add or subtract rights and duties to meet the social needs
or preferences of the twenty-first century.
Note that each regime incorporates the rules in prior regimes and adds to them.
Thus, marriage includes the criminal restrictions of the dating regime, the contract
precepts of cohabitation regime, the unitive benefits of cohabitation plus, and all the
benefits and duties of registered partnerships-as well as rights to adoption and the
symbolic tie to Western marriage traditions. This phenomenon is consistent with
the principle of sedimentation.
E. COMPARATIVE LAW AND THE THEORETICAL DEBATE
Even if I am descriptively right that some jurisdictions will accept the principle
of formal equality and legally recognize same-sex marriages as part of the
foregoing menu of options, I might be prescriptively wrong that this is a beneficent,
or at worst neutral, development. The comparative law experience provides
important but provisional support for the proposition that formal equality is a
45. See Proposition de Loi Adopt6e par L'Assemb6 Nacionale en Prernire Lecture, relative au pacte civil
de solidarit6, No. 207, 9 Dec. 1998 (visited May 2000) <http://www.senat.fr/leg/taan98-207> (copy on file with
the McGeorge Law Review).
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worthwhile goal for both gay people and for the polities in which they live. First,
the step-by-step process has revealed that same-sex unions, and potentially
marriages, are not an oxymoron. 6 Lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals can pair up
with people of the same sex and form productive unions. As Table 3 shows, the
numbers are quite modest, but there is reason to believe that the unions are
admirable ones. The evidence from Denmark, which has had a registered
partnership law since 1989, is that most of the registered couples have stayed
together (the divorce rate is quite low so far). While it is too early to compare the
break-up rates for same-sex and different-sex couples, such a comparison would be
beside the point, for the point is that such couples undermine stereotypes about
unreliable or promiscuous "homosexuals." It is also significant, and may explain
the low rates of registration, that couples registering under the partnership laws are
coming out as couples, and not just as individuals. Thus, the laws facilitate an
intriguing new phase in the history of "coming out of the closet."
47
Second, the legal recognition of same-sex unions that is best supported by
principles of justice and equality can, and perhaps usually does, have benign or
good consequences. Denmark, Sweden, and the Netherlands have given almost
complete recognition to same-sex unions, without malign consequences: there are
no reports, even from traditionalists in those countries, that different-sex families
have been weakened or that unhealthy promiscuity or sexually transmitted diseases
have become a problem. Indeed, the scanty evidence supports the opposite
hypotheses thus far. Not only have same-sex couples been able to solidify their
conception of family through registering as partners, but new family-forming
opportunities have been offered for different-sex couples.48 The pro-family and anti-
discrimination policies of these countries have contributed modestly to campaigns
to prevent the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, most prominently AIDS.
49
Moreover, there is no evidence that legal recognition of same-sex unions has
contributed to a decline in the institution of marriage. Reports from Denmark
suggest that the opposite may be the case; in the ten years since same-sex couples
have been able to register, the marriage rate for different-sex couples has been
stable, and their divorce rate has declined.50 I am dubious that there is a causal link,
46. Recall, however, that legally recognized same-sex unions are by no means unprecedented in world
history. See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 20 (recounting the historical acceptance of same-sex unions in
some cultures).
47. Of course, one does not need such a law to come out in this way. The highest ranking openly gay
judicial official in the world, Justice Michael Kirby of Australia's High Court, came out publicly by identifying
his spouse as Jan.
48. By the end of 1998, for example, 2,372 couples had registered under the Danish law and 5,217 under
the Dutch law; 1,870 of the Dutch couples were different-sex. Supra Table 3.
49. See Benny Henriksson & Hasse Ytterberg, Sweden: The Power of the Moral(istic) Left, in AIDS INTHE
INDUSTRIALIZED DEMOCRACIES: PASSIONS, POLITICS, AND POLICIES 317,321-22 (David L. Kirp & Ronald Bayer
eds., 1992).
50. See Darren Spedale, Nordic Bliss: The Danish Experience with "Gay Marriage" (1999) (unpublished
manuscript, copy on file with author).
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for the same reasons I question opponents' confidence that same-sex marriage will
ruin the institution, but the correlation between the opening up of marriage to same-
sex couples and a (perhaps temporary) halt in the institution's erosion for different-
sex couples ought to expose the element of hysteria and irresponsibility in
opponents' predictions. Furthermore, no evidence exists to show that the Danish
experience caused significant distress for homophobes, and it seems extremely
unlikely that any distress that has been felt by homophobes approaches the suicidal
distress that anti-gay policies and attitudes have created among adolescents in this
country. To be sure, the low levels of distress might owe something to the small
number of same-sex couples who have registered under these laws: 2,372 after nine
years of the Danish law, 674 after four years of the Norweigan law, 749 after four
years of the Swedish law, 45 after two years of the Icelandic law, and 5,217 after
one year of the Dutch law (Table 3). This phenomenon again illustrates how the
incrementalism of gay-equality makes legal reform easier over time, but at the cost
of real equality for gay people.
Third, and most interestingly, the comparative experience has much to suggest
about the consequences of same-sex marriage for the law's regulation of the family.
To begin with, some of what the experience teaches is consistent with conservative
and progressive criticisms of same-sex marriage. Most strikingly, early experience
is consistent with the feminist argument that same-sex marriage will be a means by
which white male couples will align themselves with mainstream society and
distance themselves from working class couples, female couples, and couples of
color or of different races.5' As Table 3 shows, all the countries but Iceland have
seen male couples take advantage of partnership registration at much higher rates
than female couples, in some years at double or triple the rates. It may be
significant, however, that the ratio of male to female couples has drastically fallen
over time in Denmark, from 3:1 in 1990 to 1.3:1 in 1997 and 0.8:1 in 1998 (the later
statistic shows more female than male couples registered), and began at 1.3:1 in the
Netherlands. There are many possible explanations for the early disparity and the
recent narrowing of the gender gap, but the evidence thus far lends tentative but
modest support to this progressive criticism.
The comparative experience cuts against the progressive criticism that same-sex
marriage will channel gay people into a patriarchal institution. Apart from the
notion that same-sex marriage contributes to the delinking of marital partnership
from gendered roles (husband = breadwinner, wife = housekeeper and child-rearer),
the struggle for same-sex marriage has already yielded new civil institutions within
which couples can choose to formalize their relationships-the Danish and Dutch
registered partnerships, the American domestic partnerships, and the French civil
solidarity pacts-and an expanded menu of options described above. Such a menu
could support the traditionalist argument that same-sex marriage undermines the
51. See Ettelbrick, supra note 29, at 8-12.
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institution of marriage itself. In the Netherlands, cohabitation and registered
partnerships are available to different-sex as well as same-sex partners. The
principle of formal equality insists that options available to same-sex couples
presumptively be available to different-sex couples. Hence, different-sex couples
in the Netherlands ought to and will have the same menu of choices, thereby
providing them with options short of marriage and arguably drawing some couples
away from that institution. Note, however, that traditionalists have helped create
their own bate noire: by opposing same-sex marriage, traditionalists have forced
proponents to move more incrementally than they otherwise would and, therefore,
to seek institutions short of marriage. That those institutions short of marriage have
become open to different-sex couples ought not be surprising, given the gay rights
movement's general commitment to the principle of formal equality and the
demand for such institutions by straight and bisexual people. Likewise, the tactics
of some progressive critics of same-sex marriage may make their prophecies self-
fulfilling. By insisting that same-sex marriage will domesticate gay radicalism and
marginalize unpartnered lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals, these critics are
contributing to a discourse of self-marginalization rather than exploring the new
opportunities opened up by the menu of options I describe.
IV. CONCLUSION
Conservatives and progressives will continue to be frustrated by the forward
march of the same-sex marriage movement, but their frustration lies in the nature
of our dynamic yet pragmatic society. Urbanization and associated developments
are pressing the industrialized world toward same-sex marriage or its functional
equivalent, and traditionalist resistance is either futile or counterproductive. The
more traditionalists holler and obstruct, the more they will press the law to create
new institutions responsive to different-sex as well as same-sex desires for union.
Progressive objections to using marriage as a vehicle for gay rights are equally
futile in the short term, for the simple reason that marriage has long been a focal
point for desire and aspiration in our culture, and apparently for reasons that remain
popular. That not only makes it an attractive aspiration for many same-sex couples,
but also makes it a convenient target for gay rights activism, even in countries or
states where activists have to accept compromises. In the longer term, though, I
think progressive critiques will grow more persuasive, and Western polities will
have to think more deeply about how best to structure the options on the menu of
interpersonal commitment.
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Appendix I
Country-by-Country Survey of Laws Relating to Sexual Minorities
Belgium
Sodomy and Age of Consent. Sodomy was discriminalized during the French
occupation of what is now Belgium (1792), but for most of Belgium's independent
history (after 1830) there were different ages of consent. Section 372 of Penal Code,
prohibiting homosexual contact between persons over 18 and consenting partners
under 18, was repealed in 1985, equalizing age of consent to 16 for both
homosexuals and heterosexuals. See International Lesbian and Gay Association,
World Legal Survey: Belgium (visited April 2000) <http://www.ilga.org>
[hereinafter cited as ILGA, World Legal Survey].
Cohabiting Couples. The Belgian legislature adopted the Law of 23-11-98
which extended legal benefits to cohabiting same-sex couples. The law is expected
to be implemented in the year 2000. See ILGA, World Legal Survey: Belgium.
Brazil
Sodomy and Age of Consent. Since 1823, homosexual behavior between
consenting adults has been legal-unless the adults are both soldiers. The age of
consent for both homosexual and heterosexual activities is 14 years. Nonetheless,
police harass gay people under "public decency" and "outrageous behavior" laws.
See ILGA, World Legal Survey: Brazil.
Canada
Sodomy. Criminal Code § 159(1) makes it an offense to engage in an act of anal
intercourse. Section 159(2)(a) exempts private, consensual anal sex between
husband and wife. Section 159(2)(b) exempts private, consensual anal sex between
any two persons 18 years or older.
Age of Consent. Criminal Code §§ 151 (sexual interference with child) and
153(1)(a) & (b) (sexual exploitation of young person) are written in gender neutral
terms.
Anti-Discrimination Law. Canadian Human Rights Act (a federal act), RSC
1985, c. H-6, was amended in 1996 to include sexual orientation, effective June 20,
1996, Bill C-33. In Haig and Birch v. Canada, (1992), 9 OR (3d) 495, Ontario
Court of Appeals had held that Charter of Rights and Freedoms required that sexual
orientation be read into Canadian Human Rights Act as prohibited grounds of
discrimination. Federal Government did not appeal, so Canadian Human Rights
Commission began applying the Canadian Human Rights Act throughout Canada
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as though sexual orientation were listed. Accord, Vriendv. Alburta, [1998] 1 S.C.R.
493 (Sup. Ct. Can. 1998).
Same-Sex Benefits. In Attorney General v. M. andH., [1999] S.C.R. (March 18,
1999), the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that provinces having laws conferring
benefits on cohabiting different-sex partners had to extend those laws to same-sex
partners as well. In February 2000, the federal government introduced legislation
to create nationwide parity of benefits for same-sex couples and different-sex
common law couples.
Adoption. Provincial law neither prohibits, nor expressly permits, adoption by
lesbians, gay men, or same-sex couples. The effect of legislation is typically to
exclude same-sex couples from adopting, while permitting single gay men or
lesbians to adopt. Most adoption legislation restricts step-parent adoption to
opposite sex couples, and in some jurisdictions, to married couples, making it
impossible for lesbians or gay men to adopt their partner's child. See DONALD G.
CASSWELL, LESBIANS, GAY MEN, AND CANADIAN LAW 290 (1996).
China
No specific statement in Criminal Code about homosexual status, but: Criminal
Law Art. 106 says: "All hooliganism should be subject to arrest and sentence." In
practice, hooliganism has included homosexual behavior. See THE SOCiOLEGAL
CONTROL OFHoMOSEXUAL1TY: AMULTI-NATION COMPARISON 63 (DonaldJ. West
et al., eds., 1997) [hereinafter cited as MuLTI-NATION COMPARISON].
Czech Republic
Sodomy. Consensual homosexual behavior between adults was decriminalized
in 1961 (Law 140/1961).
Age of Consent. In 1990, Law175/1990 equalized the age of consent for
heterosexual and homosexual partners by repealing section 244 of the Penal Code.
See MLTI-NATION COMPARISON 246.
Denmark
Sodomy and Age of Consent. Denmark's reform of its Penal Code in 1930
dropped sodomy laws but left many discriminations in place. In 1976, the same age
of consent (15 years) was adopted for both homosexual and heterosexual relations.
See ILGA, World Legal Survey: Denmark.
Anti-Discrimination. In 1987, sexual orientation was added to the anti-
discrimination clause contained in Penal Code (Art. 266) and to the Anti-
Discrimination Act of 1971.
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Registered Partnerships. Act No. 372 of 7 June, 1989 permitted partnership
registration for two persons of the same sex. Partners need not live together or have
sexual relations, although one must be a Danish citizen. Regulation has the same
legal effect as marriage, except where otherwise provided by legislation. References
to "marriage" or "spouse" in Danish law automatically include registered
partnerships, except that parties in registered partnerships cannot adopt a child and
cannot have joint custody (as of 2000). See FAMILY LAW IN EUROPE 58 (Carolyn
Hamilton et al. eds., 1995).
England
Sodomy. The Sexual Offenses Act of 1967 decriminalized private, consensual
homosexual acts between men over the age of 21.
Age of Consent. Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 lowered age of
consent for male homosexuals to 18 years (see § 145). Note, however, that present
law sets the age of consent for heterosexual and lesbian contact at 16 years.
Finland
Sodomy and Age of Consent. Sodomy was discriminalized in 1971, but it was
not until June 1998 that Parliament equalized the age of consent for homosexual
and heterosexual relations. See ILGA, World Legal Survey: Finland.
Anti-Discrimination. The Constitution as amended by Law 17 July 1995/969
prohibits discrimination on account of sex, age, etc., or "any other reason related
to the person," which is accepted as including sexual orientation. Law 21 April
1995/578 prohibits "sexual preference" discrimination in public accommodations
and employment. See ILGA, World Legal Survey: Finland.
France
Sodomy and Age of Consent. The French Revolution's criminal code of 1791
dropped the crime against sodomy, and it was never reinstated. The age of consent
was equalized at age 15 in 1987. See ILGA, World Legal Survey: France.
Anti-Discrimination. In 1985, the Prohibition of Discrimination (Art. 187-1,
187-2, 416, and 416-1) of the Penal Code was expanded to include discrimination
on grounds of "moral habits," which includes homosexuality. See Loi no. 85-772
du 25 juliet 1985.
Pactes Civiles. In 1998, France adopted legislation creating new pactes civiles
de solidariti for same-sex couples. See Proposition de Loi Adopt6e par L'Assembl6
Nacionale en Premi~re Lecture, relative au pacte civil de solidarit6, No. 207, 9 Dec.
1998 (visited May 2000) <http://www.senat.fr/leg/taan98-207>.
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Germany
Sodomy and Age of Consent. Federal Republic: Criminal Law Reform Act of
1969 decriminalized homosexual sex if partners were over the age of 21 (lowered
to 18 soon thereafter).
German Democratic Republic: Art. 151, passed in 1968, deleted the simple
crime of homosexuality, but penalized sexual acts carried out by an adult with a
juvenile under the age of 18 who is of the same sex. After a Supreme Court decision
in 1989, the East German parliament deleted Art. 151 from the Penal Code,
equalizing the age of consent laws.
Unification: In 1994, Germany voided Article 175 of Penal Code, which made
punishable sex between males if one of them is under the age of 18, while the
opposite sex age of consent was 14. The new Article 182 of Penal Code equalized
the age of consent. See MULTI-NATION COMPARISON 262.
Greenland
Greenland is a self-governing dependency of Denmark, most of whose laws
apply to Greenland as well. The main exception is that Greenland did not accept the
1989 Danish Registered Partnership Law until 1994. Such partnerships became
effective in Greenland in 1996. See ILGA, World Legal Survey: Greenland.
Hungary
Sodomy and Age of Consent. In 1961, Hungary descriminalized homosexual
acts between consenting adults if they were both older than 20 years. In 1967, the
age of consent for same-sex intimacy was lowered to 18 years-in contrast to the
age of 14 years for different-sex intimacy. See Lilla Farkas, "Nice on Paper:
Legislation vs. Practice in Hungary" (1999).
Cohabitation. In its decision 14/1995, on the legal equality of same-sex
partnerships, the Hungarian Constitutional Court ruled that the state could refuse
to recognize same-sex marriage but was required to recognize same-sex cohabiting
relationships in the same way it recognized different-sex cohabiting relationships.
Parliament enacted legislation to that effect in 1996.
Iceland
Age of Consent. In July 1992, the Icelandic parliament equalized the age of
consent at 14 years for both homosexual and heterosexual relations. See ILGA,
World Legal Survey: Iceland.
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Anti-Discrimination. In 1996, the Icelandic parliament amended the country's
penal code to prohibit antigay hate speech and discrimination in sales or service.
See ILGA, World Legal Survey: Iceland.
Registered Partnerships. In 1996, the Icelandic parliament adopted the
Registered Partnership Law. Similar to that adopted in Denmark, Norway, and
Sweden, the Icelandic law also gives lesbian and gay couples joint custody of the
children either partner brings to the family. See ILGA, World Legal Survey:
Iceland.
Ireland
Sodomy. The Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 1993, repealed the complete
prohibition on al sexual acts between males, and legalized private, homosexual acts
so long as both parties are at least age 17 and neither is mentally impaired.
Anti-Discrimination. An Employment Equality Bill was adopted in 1999 that
protects against workplace discrimination. See ILGA, World Legal Survey: Ireland.
Israel
Sodomy and Age of Consent. In 1988, the Knesset repealed § 351 of the Penal
Code, which made male sodomy a crime. The minimum legal age for homosexual
and heterosexual relations was equalized at age 16. See ILGA, World Legal
Survey: Israel.
Anti-Discrimination. In 1992, the Knesset approved a law prohibiting job
discrimination on the basis of sexual preference. See ILGA, World Legal
Survey: Israel.
Cohabiting Partners. In El-Al Israel v. Danilowitz (May 1994), the Supreme
Court of Israel interpreted the equality provisions of Israel's Labor Code to require
employers to treat same-sex cohabiting partners similar to different-sex spouses for
purposes of employment.
Mexico
Sodomy. No state Penal Code considers homosexual contact in itself a criminal
offense, except that Article 201 of Penal Code of Federal District (which includes
Mexico City) states: anyone "who facilitates corruption of a minor under 18 years
of age.., by inducing to the practice of begging, alcoholism, to the consumption
of narcotic drugs, to the practice of prostitution, homosexualism... the punishment
will be an imprisonment of 5 to 10 years" (Penal Code, 1995).
2000 / The Same-Sex Marriage Debate
Netherlands
Sodomy andAge of Consent. Section 248 of Criminal Code set age of consent
at 21 for homosexuals, while heterosexual age of consent was much lower. This
distinction was repealed by the Law of April 8, 1971, Staatsblad [the official law
gazette of the Netherlands] 212.
Anti-Discrimination. Since 1992, anti-discrimination provisions of Criminal
Code that ban racial discrimination have been expanded to include homosexual
preference. Section 429 quater prohibits workplace discrimination. See MULTI-
NATION COMPARISON 303-05.
Registered Partnerships. The Netherlands adopted a Partner Registration Act
in 1998. Different-sex as well as same-sex couples can register as partners and are
entitled to all the benefits and duties of marriage, but not the right to adopt children.
Also, divorce is easier for registered partners. See ILGA, World Legal Survey:
Netherlands.
Norway
Sodomy andAge of Consent. Norway in 1972 repealed Penal Code § 213, which
prohibited sexual acts between men. Following repeal, the age of consent has been
the same for homosexual as for heterosexual relations, age 16. See ILGA, World
Legal Survey: Norway.
Anti-Discrimination. Section 135(a) prohibits discrimination against gay men
and lesbians. Section 349a prohibits discrimination in business or similar activities.
Both laws were adopted in 1981.
Registered Partnerships. Act of Registered Partnerships of April 30, 1993,
No. 40 gives homosexuals the right to registered partnerships (see para XX), which
has the same legal effect as marriage, except for right to adopt children. See
Marianne Roth, The Norwegian Act on Registered Partnership for Homosexual
Couples, 35 J. FAM. L. 467 (1997).
Pakistan
Sodomy. Section 377 of the Penal Code of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan
prohibits "carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man." Such acts
carries with it a punishment of up to 100 lashes and from two years to life
imprisonment. See MULTI-NATION COMPARISON 120.
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Russia
Sodomy. Art. 121.1 of the Russian Federation Criminal Code was repealed in
1993 as part of wide-ranging reform law. This article had made muzhelozhstvo (sex
between men) punishable by imprisonment for up to 5 years. Article 121.2, in cases
of sex between men involving threat or physical force, remains in effect. See
MULTI-NATION COMPARISON 229-30.
Scotland and Northern Ireland
Sodomy. The English Sexual Offences Act of 1967 did not apply to Scotland,
and male homosexual conduct, which remained illegal until the Criminal Justice
(Scotland) Act of 1980. Following a judgment by the European Court of Human
Rights (Dudgeon v. UK, 4 EHRR 149 (1981)), the provisions were extended to
Northern Ireland in 1982.
Age of Consent. The Criminal Justice and Public Order Act of 1994 lowered the
age of consent for private homosexual acts from the age of 21 (in section 80 of the
Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980 and in Article 3 of the Homosexual Offences
(Northern Ireland) Order 1982) to the age of 18.
South Africa
Sodomy. The Constitutional Court of South Africa invalidated the nation's
sodomy, gross indecency, and other homosexual offense laws under the 1996 and
1997 Constitutions. See National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality v.
Minister of Justice (Judgment of Oct. 9, 1998).
Anti-Discrimination. Section 9(3) the South African Constitution of 1997
prohibits the state from discrimination against anyone on the basis of sexual
orientation; § 9(4) extends the anti-discrimination duty to private actors as well.
Partnership Benefits. The Constitutional Court of South Africa required the
government to grant the same benefits to same-sex partners that its immigration
laws extends to different-sex "spouses." See National Coalition for Gay and
Lesbian Equality v. Minister of Home Affairs (Judgment of Dec. 2, 1999).
Spain
Sodomy andAge of Consent. Sodomy has not been a crime in Spain since 1822
(although "habitual homosexual acts" were criminal in 1928-32). Spain's new
Criminal Code, adopted November 24, 1995, eliminated distinctions in age of
consent, which is 12 years for homosexual as well as heterosexual relations. See
ILGA, World Legal Survey: Spain.
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Anti-Discrimination. Article 14 of the 1978 Constitution prohibits
discrimination on the basis of sex, age, religion, creed, political ideology, or
"whatever other social or personal circumstance." Courts have usually fit sexual
orientation under this residual category. The Law of 16-11-1995 bans sexual
orientation discrimination in housing, employment, public services, and
professional activities. See ILGA, World Legal Survey: Spain.
Partnership. The government has proposed a partnership law, but it has been
stalled since 1997. Partnership laws were adopted at the regional level in Catalonia
on 30 June 1998 and Aragon on 12 March 1999. See ILGA, World Legal Survey:
Spain.
Sweden
Sodomy andAge of Consent. Same-sex intimacy was discriminalized in 1944,
and the age of consent was equalized at age 15 in 1978. See ILGA, World Legal
Survey: Sweden.
Anti-Discrimination. In 1987, the Parliament amended Ch. 16, par. 9 of the
Penal Code to make sexual orientation a ground for unlawful discrimination in
employment and provision of service to the public. An omnibus workplace anti-
discrimination law went into force on 1 May 1999. See ILGA, World Legal Survey:
Sweden.
Cohabitation. The Unisexual Cohabitees Act (Lag 1987:813) prescribes that the
Cohabitees (Joint Homes) Act is applicable to homosexual cohabitees. This
Cohabitees Act states that on the dissolution of the cohabitation, an equal division
of the value of the home and household goods which have been acquired for
common use shall take place. On death of a party, surviving party has right to equal
division of common household goods and joint dwelling to retain as much of the
property as equals twice the base sum applicable under the National Insurance Act
at date of death. See ILGA, World Legal Survey: Sweden.
Registered Partnerships. Lag 1994:1117, Om Registrerat Partnerskap, adopted
June 1, 1994, effective January 1, 1995, provides a registration procedure whereby
same-sex partners can obtain all the obligations and benefits of marriage, except
that same-sex couples cannot (1) adopt children, (2) have access to state-provided
artificial insemination, or (3) have the benefit of certain state-provided benefits. See
ILGA, World Legal Survey: Sweden.
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Appendix H
States that Include Sexual Orientation in their Penalty-
Enhancement Statutes
Vermont: VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 1455 (1993)
California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 422.75 (West 1997)
District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-4003 (Supp. 1994)
New Jersey: N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:12-1(e) (West Supp. 1994)
Massachusetts: MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 265, § 39 (West 1999)
Illinois: 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/12-7.1 (West Supp. 1996)
Minnesota: MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.2231 (West Supp. 1996)
Wisconsin: WIS. STAT. § 939.645 (1998)
Connecticut: CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53(a)-181(b) (West Supp. 1994)
New Hampshire: N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:6(g) (1997)
Nevada: NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.185 (Supp. 1995)
Rhode Island: R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-5-13 (1995)
Oregon: OR. REV. STAT. § 166.155 (1995)
Washington: WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.36.080 (West Supp. 1994)
Louisiana: LA. CODE tit. 14, § 107.2 (West Supp. 2000)
Delaware: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 1304 (1994)
Iowa: IOWA CODE ANN. § 729A.2 (West 1992)
Kentucky: KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.031 (Michie 1990 & Supp. 1998)
Maine: ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1151 (West 1997)
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Nebraska: NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-111 (1997)
Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.085 (West 1992)
Arizona: ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 41-1822 (West 1999) (collecting hate crime data)
Appendix IM
States Recognizing Domestic Partners
Hawaii: HAW. REV. STAT. § 572C1 (Reciprocal Beneficiaries Law)
California: CAL. FAM. CODE § 297 (West Supp. 2000)
District of Columbia: D.C. CODE ANN. § 36-1402 (1981)
Vermont: Vermont Labor Relations Board decision, Grievance of B.M., S.S., C.M.,
and J.R., Docket No. 92-32, extends medical and dental benefits to domestic
partners of state employees.
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